NOTE
Please Plead Me: Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Implications for
Oklahoma Pleading
I. Introduction
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 1 the Supreme Court first applied a
plausibility pleading standard to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim in an antitrust case. After Twombly required a plaintiff to plead more
than just blanket allegations and legal conclusions, circuit courts struggled
to ascertain whether the Twombly decision applied across the board, or
whether the decision was specific to the complexities of antitrust litigation.2
Most recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified its previous
decisions regarding pleading requirements and held that under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8 all plaintiffs are required to plead “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” 3
As a result of the Iqbal amplification of the Twombly pleading standard,
there now exist major discrepancies between the new federal standard of
pleading and state standards of pleading, including Oklahoma’s continued
liberal interpretation of its notice pleading statute.4 In addition, there is still
at least one circuit which initially refused to extend the Iqbal decision, and
at least one U.S. Senator seeking to nullify the decision through
legislation. 5
The discrepancies between state and federal interpretation of virtually
identical pleading statutes create a system where a complaint may now be
1. See 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. See Matthew A. Josephson, Some Things Are Better Left Said: Pleading Practice After
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REV. 867, 887-89 (2008) (noting how courts have
differed in their application of the Twombly decision); Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A
“Plausible” Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 838 (2008) (stating that the Twombly
decision “creates uncertainty among lower courts and practitioners”).
3. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
4. See Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 2008 OK 1, & 7, 176 P.3d 1204, 1208.
5. See Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that Iqbal may not
apply because it is “special in its own way” but ultimately granting a motion to dismiss on
other grounds); Notice Pleading Restoration Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed by
Senator Arlen Specter in order “[t]o provide that Federal courts shall not dismiss complaints
under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957)”).
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found sufficient in an Oklahoma court, but insufficient in a federal court.
Consider a citizen of Oklahoma who has been wrongfully convicted for
rape. The falsely accused plaintiff spends nineteen years in prison while
attempting to obtain the DNA evidence that eventually exonerates him. 6
But his post-release claim against a police chief for denying him access to
DNA evidence is thrown out by the Tenth Circuit because the factual
contentions in his petition addressed general allegations, and the plaintiff’s
alleged legal theory was not supported by any facts attributable to the police
chief. 7
In response to petitions which include general allegations, the Tenth
Circuit has stated that “the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff
could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is
insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this
plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these
claims.” 8 Using the newly adopted Twombly standard, the facts that this
wrongfully accused plaintiff alleged did not meet the plausibility threshold
demanded at the pleading level. 9 Would the claim survive in an Oklahoma
state court using a more liberal standard? Should it survive?
Requiring heightened pleading standards can waste judicial resources
through a system of strict judicial inquiry of all petitions before the court.
Yet it can preserve judicial resources by rescuing defendants from meritless
claims. Conversely, more liberal pleading requirements can provide
plaintiffs an avenue for gaining access to the court for remedy of a wrong,
and provide them with discovery tools to extract information from the
defendant to evidence the wrong committed. Yet, applying the more liberal
pleading standard can also expose defendants to intrusive invasion of
private documents, conversations, and interrogatories simply to allow a
plaintiff to “drum up” the basis for a claim. The Iqbal decision addresses
these difficulties and weighs them in favor of defendants, requiring what
facially appears to be a more heightened standard of proof for plaintiff’s
claim to survive a motion to dismiss.
This note describes the possible implications of the Iqbal decision as it
relates to state pleading standards, focusing specifically on whether it is in
Oklahoma’s best interest to adjust its standards to conform to this
precedent. Part II discusses how statutory pleading requirements initially
6. See Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2008).
7. See id. at 1287.
8. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Ridge at Red
Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007)).
9. See Bryson, 534 F.3d at 1286-87.
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evolved from code pleading to notice pleading in both federal and
Oklahoma courts. Part III addresses significant Supreme Court decisions
interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, culminating with the Iqbal
decision. Part III then summarizes state supreme court responses to this
recent shift in federal pleading standards. Part IV analyzes the Iqbal
decision and its implications for plaintiffs and defendants if applied in a
similar manner in Oklahoma courts, concluding that while it is not
necessary for Oklahoma to adopt Twombly’s plausibility standards, a more
accurate application of the current pleading standard is needed. A plaintiff
must be required to plead more than elements of a cause of action in order
to be given access to discovery resources. Finally, Part V will briefly
summarize the main points of the note and conclude.
II. History of Pleading Requirements: The Evolution from Code Pleading to
Notice Pleading
A. The Development of Federal Pleading Standards and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
federal courts used the same system of pleading as the state where the
federal court was located.10 Many states modeled their pleading system
requirements after “The Field Code,” which was drafted by David Dudley
Field and which served as the New York Code for pleading. 11 Commonly
termed “code pleading,” this system required a petition to contain “[a]
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and
concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a
person of common understanding to know what [was] intended . . . .” 12 But
a “statement of facts” was easier said than done, as the word “facts” was
interpreted as “ultimate facts.” 13 Evidentiary facts and conclusions of law,
though informative, were not accepted.14

10. See Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure:
Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1299 (1935).
11. See Josephson, supra note 2, at 874.
12. Charles E. Clark, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 211 n.2 (2d ed. 1947)
(quoting N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act ' 255, repealed by Act of April 4, 1962, ch. 308, ' 10001,
1962 N.Y. Laws 1297, 1549).
13. See George B. Fraser, The Petition in Oklahoma, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 423, 424 (1952).
14. See id.
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The result created a system where “the plaintiff may not plead the facts
as they happened, but must plead the conclusions that should be drawn
from the actual acts or events.” 15 For example:
In one case which involved an action on an insurance policy, the
plaintiff, relying on the statutory presumption of death, alleged
that the insured had been absent and not heard from since August
4, 1914. The court stated that this allegation was insufficient
since the plaintiff’s right to recover depended on the ultimate
fact that the insured was dead and that the plaintiff should have
alleged that the insured was dead instead of facts that would
establish his death. This result is questioned in view of the fact
that proof of absence for the statutory period would support a
verdict. 16
Because the plaintiff pleaded facts to show the insured was dead (a set of
evidentiary facts) rather than pleading that the insured was dead (an
ultimate fact) the claim was thrown out of court under the code pleading
standard. 17
When the plaintiff was trapped in this unfortunate loophole, his case was
dismissed for a failure to state a claim. Though he would most likely be
granted leave to amend his complaint and return to court, the plaintiff was
still punished under the technicalities of code pleading. The plaintiff would
be sent to reword his petition to plead ultimate, rather than evidentiary
facts, a technicality that could be the product of even the most carefully
plead petition. Ultimately, this produced a standard that was “easy to state
but difficult to apply” as “[m]any concepts were a blend of fact and
conclusion, and the Code’s rigid distinction led to inconsistent results
concerning what level of detail needed to be pleaded, even for simple
claims . . . .” 18 Charles E. Clark, a chief drafter of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Second Circuit judge, commented that the distinction
between facts and law or evidence was one of “generality and particularity
in stating the transaction sued upon and . . . considerable flexibility should
be accorded the pleader.” 19 However, the code pleading system of parsing
a petition down to ultimate facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions of law
was all but flexible for the pleader.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 425.
Id.
See id.
Josephson, supra note 2, at 875.
Clark & Moore, supra note 10, at 1301.
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Because code pleading led to such inconsistent results and confusion, the
Rules Enabling Act was passed, and in 1938, the Supreme Court
promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of this new set of
laws radically departed from code pleading requirements and instead
required the plaintiff to only give the defendant “notice” of the plaintiff’s
claim against him. 20 This procedural reform had the effect of leaving
much, but not all, of the factual detail to be uncovered as the litigation
continued. Specifically, the newly adopted rules stated that “a pleading that
states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”21 Plaintiff was no longer
forced to examine his statements to determine whether his ultimate fact was
actually an evidentiary fact. This new standard required the plaintiff to
include enough information in his petition so the defendant was aware of
the nature of the suit, facilitating an answer without being boxed into the
strict method of code pleading.
B. The Development of Oklahoma’s Pleading Standards
The Oklahoma Territorial Legislature first adopted code pleading in
Forty-five years after the Territory began to employ code
1893. 22
pleading, the federal courts adopted notice pleading. Despite the federal
change, Oklahoma continued to use code pleading language in its courts for
over forty more years. 23 Oklahoma retained elements of code pleading in
the pleading statute, requiring a plaintiff to include “[a] statement of the
facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, and
without repetition” 24 until the state adopted the federal notice pleading
standard in 1984. 25 In Oklahoma’s code pleading, the same three types of
allegations existed as in federal code pleading: ultimate facts, evidentiary
facts, and conclusions of law. 26

20. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated in part by Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (noting that “all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests”) (footnote omitted); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ' 8.04 (3d ed. 2010).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
22. George B. Fraser, Improving the Pleading Process in Oklahoma, 53 OKLA. B.J. 495,
495 (1982).
23. See id. at 495; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2008(A)(1)(Supp. 1984) (current version at
12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2008(A)(1)(Supp. 2010)).
24. 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 264 (1981).
25. See Act of May 1, 1984, ch. 164, ' 8, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 583.
26. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. ' 2008 committee cmt. (West 2010).
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As in the federal system, code pleading required plaintiffs to plead the
ultimate facts of the claim creating similar difficulties for plaintiffs. 27 In
order to determine the ultimate facts of the claim, the court refused to
consider evidentiary facts and conclusions of law as a basis for a claim for
relief in the petition.28 In Oklahoma, code pleading created a system which
“caused difficulty to attorneys and judges alike who . . . found themselves
confused as to whether a particular allegation [was] one of fact, evidence,
or law.” 29 If a pleading was found to be “too detailed, it may violate the
rule forbidding evidentiary facts and, if too broad, may be a conclusion of
law, thereby failing to state a cause of action.” 30 In short, while a code
petition in Oklahoma would survive only if plaintiff’s facts showed he must
recover, a federal complaint would survive if plaintiff’s facts merely
showed that he may recover. 31 If the “code petition contain[ed] allegations
that [were] subject to several interpretations . . . the petition [was]
insufficient even though proof of the facts alleged would support a verdict
for the plaintiff.” 32 But in federal court, if any one of various inferences
drawn would allow plaintiff to succeed, the complaint survived. 33
Determining a prima facie case and exactly how to articulate it to the
defendant and to the court was a particularized process and puzzling to
many who attempted it.
After realizing the difficulties inherent in code pleading, Oklahoma did
not treat petitions quite as harshly as many previous federal courts,
generally allowing a petition if it was “informative;”34 meaning a cause of
action would successfully state a claim if it could be “‘inferred with
sufficient clarity to advise court or counsel of the basis of her complaint.’” 35
In Oklahoma, the petition needed to “show that the plaintiff ha[d] a claim or
cause of action, but the claim d[id] not have to be alleged in a certain
way. . . . Thus, Oklahoma . . . avoided many of the troubles that other courts
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Jimmie J. Hamilton, Note, Pleading: Fact Pleading in Oklahoma C Time For a
Change?, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 700 (1977); see also Fraser, supra note 13, at 424 (citing
Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COL. L. REV.
416, 417 (1921)) (stating “[t]he results have been very arbitrary because there is no logical
distinction between statements which are grouped by courts under phrases ‘statement of fact’
and ‘conclusions of law’”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Hamilton, supra note 29, at 700.
31. See Fraser, supra note 13, at 431.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 426.
35. Id. (citing Branson v. Branson, 1942 OK 77, & 49, 123 P.2d 643, 651).
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. . . experienced in distinguishing between evidentiary facts, ultimate facts
and conclusions of law.” 36
Interestingly, on its face Oklahoma’s statute read as code pleading, but in
practice, as Oklahoma courts attempted a more simple procedure, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted language from a Supreme Court case
aimed at notice pleading in order to evaluate claims under motions to
dismiss. 37 As Oklahoma began to adopt other provisions set forth in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many in the legal field began to advocate
for the statutory adoption of notice pleading, but the balance between
viewing the notice standard as properly rejecting meritless claims or
wasting judicial resources was a source of contention. 38 In addition to
being confusing, because a plaintiff could appeal a dismissal of his
complaint, or simply file a new action, rejecting claims for code
technicalities took “much of the court’s time as well as that of the
parties.” 39 Alternatively, by “assigning a lesser role to the pleadings as do
the Federal Rules, much less time would be spent in amending pleadings.”40
Scholars also looked to other states’ modification of code pleading for
guidance and options for Oklahoma change. 41 Concerns revolved around
whether Oklahoma should keep language requiring plaintiffs to state a
“cause of action” or change the language to require a “claim for relief,” and
whether Oklahoma should adopt the new federal rules entirely to simplify
practicing in both state and federal court. George Fraser, former professor
of law at the University of Oklahoma College of Law, supposed that
“[s]ince a plaintiff must show the existence of the elements of his claim
whether he is required by statute to state a claim, a right to relief, or a cause

36. Id. at 451-52.
37. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 264 (1984), repealed by Act of May 1, 1984, ch. 164, ' 32,
1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 628; Powell v. Seay, 1976 OK 22, & 12, 553 P.2d 161, 164.
38. Hamilton, supra note 29, at 702 (noting that “[w]hile few outright miscarriages of
justice have resulted through dismissal of the action when, through inadvertence or lack of
skill, the pleader failed to include sufficient facts in his petition, prolonged and useless delay
has undoubtedly resulted from the testing of the sufficiency of the pleading and in
amendments thereof when necessary and permitted”).
39. Id. at 701.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 703-04 (looking at North Carolina’s altered requirements for a possible
alternative to Oklahoma’s current standard); see also Fraser, supra note 22, at 497
(considering how a Texas statute retained portions of code pleading in stating a “cause of
action” when adopting a notice pleading statute); Recent Developments, 34 OKLA. L. REV.
194, 204 n.9 (1981) (citing Illinois, New York, and Texas statutes for evidence of states who
retained the phrase “cause of action” in pleading statutes adopted post-Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure) (footnote omitted).
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of action, any one of these phrases may be used in the Oklahoma
Statutes.” 42 Moreover, while “[t]he adoption of all the federal rules would
simplify the practice of law because attorneys would have to know only one
set of rules of practice . . . . Retaining the phrase >cause of action’ would not
require a long verbose petition . . . .” 43
Ultimately, Oklahoma adopted the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) verbatim. 44 In explaining the movement to notice
pleading, the Committee Comment to the new section relied on United
States Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that the new rule was
formulated to give “‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which is rests.’” 45 Moreover, the Committee noted the new
section “[did] not prohibit the pleading of facts or conclusions of law as
long as the pleading [gave] fair notice of the nature of the claim asserted.” 46
The Committee further stated that the shift to notice pleading
“acknowledge[d] that modern devices such as discovery, pretrial
conferences, and summary judgments are more effective methods of
performing the functions of disclosing the factual and legal issues in
dispute, pretrial planning, and disposing of frivolous or unfounded claims
and defenses which historically were performed by the pleadings.” 47
The statutory adoption of notice pleading in Oklahoma was designed to
be a mirror image of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and at the time of
adoption it was applied in the same manner as in federal courts. However,
the recent federal shift in pleading procedure raises the specter of code
pleading, leaving states like Oklahoma in a position to determine whether to
continue the current liberal standard applied since the adoption of notice
pleading or whether to conform to recent federal precedent.
III. Development of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8

42. Fraser, supra note 22, at 497.
43. Id.
44. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), with 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2008(A)(1) (Supp. 1984).
45. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. 2008 committee cmt. (2010) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly, federal courts applied
the same interpretation of notice pleading for fifty years, following the 1957
case Conley v. Gibson. 48

48. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
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A. Conley v. Gibson and the Freedom to Plead as You Please
In Conley, after a railroad eliminated forty-five jobs belonging to black
workers, only to replace the majority of the positions with white workers,
the discharged employees sued their collective bargaining agent for unfair
representation based on discrimination.49 While the claim was initially
dismissed at trial court on a jurisdictional issue, the respondent requested
that the Supreme Court take the liberty to address the failure to state a claim
issue, arguing that if the jurisdictional issue was overturned, the dismissal
should be upheld for failure to state a claim. 50 The Supreme Court affirmed
the holdings of various circuit courts advising judges “that a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
[that] would entitle him to relief.”51 The Conley Court found it sufficient
that the petitioners had alleged they “were discharged wrongfully by the
Railroad and that the Union, acting according to plan, refused to protect
their jobs as it did those of white employees or to help them with their
grievances all because they were Negroes.” 52 To the Court, the plaintiffs
had sufficiently supplemented these allegations with sufficient detail of
events underlying the claim. 53
If the allegations were proved true, the petitioners would have a claim,
and this was adequate for survival of a motion to dismiss. 54 The Court did
not weigh the probability of the allegations.55 The Court acknowledged
that discovery and pretrial procedures allowed plaintiffs and defendants an
opportunity to parse away the claim and force their opponent to divulge
exactly what facts evidenced the issues at stake in the claim or
counterclaim. 56 In addition, this standard of pleading protected plaintiffs by
preventing litigation from becoming a “game of skill in which one misstep
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome,” ultimately “facilitat[ing] a
proper decision on the merits.” 57 Conley rested on the proposition that “the
truth will out” and arguably lifted the bar in the plaintiff’s favor by seeming
to accommodate most any pleadings as sufficient to trigger subsequent

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id. at 42-43.
Id. 45-46.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 46.
See id. at 47.
See id. at 45-46.
See id. at 45-48.
See id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
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litigation. The language used in Conley was eventually adopted by at least
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia in dismissing complaints for
failure to state a claim for relief.58
B. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Pleading Plausibly
In 2007, the Supreme Court revisited pleading standards in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly. 59 In Twombly, respondents represented a putative class
suing Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) for violation under ' 1
of the Sherman Act 60 which prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce .
. . .” 61 The respondents claimed that the ILECs generally engaged in
parallel conduct by making agreements which resulted in higher prices,
poorer networks, and impaired competition. 62 Upon reviewing a motion to
dismiss, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Conley and found
the claim sufficient, stating that a court “would have to conclude that there
is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
particular parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than
coincidence” in order to dismiss the claim. 63
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter refused to apply the Conley “no
set of facts” standard in a 7-2 decision, claiming that the Conley standard
was “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted
pleading standard.” 64 Instead, the Court required antitrust plaintiffs to
plead enough factual matter to “nudge[] their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible,” lest their complaints be dismissed. 65 This would
involve “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action [would] not do.”66 Because the defendant’s
parallel conduct could be evidence of happenstance lawful conduct, the
Supreme Court held that the complaint needed factual allegations that
would “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery [would] reveal
evidence of illegal agreement.”67

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
See id. at 550.
15 U.S.C. ' 1 (2000).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 554.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.
See id. at 570.
Id. at 555.
See id. at 556.
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The Court formulated this rejection and replacement of Conley in a
complex antitrust suit that presented pleading issues very different from
those raised by the ordinary plaintiff. The majority relied on many issues
specific to antitrust litigation, and signaled that the holding should be
contextually contained.68 First, the Court stated that certiorari was granted
to “address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through
allegations of parallel conduct . . . .” 69 Next, when analyzing the issue, the
Court noted that the case “present[ed] the antecedent question of what a
plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim under '1 of the Sherman Act”
and further described what rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure required. 70 It appeared that the Court was focusing its analysis
on what constituted sufficient pleading specifically in an antitrust suit and
not in federal pleadings in general.
To the Court, the primary reason for treading cautiously when allowing a
factually deficient claim to survive a motion to dismiss was the potentially
burdensome expense of antitrust litigation. 71 The Court observed that the
threat of intrusive and expensive discovery could cause defendants to settle
claims even when they were merely innocent victims of “anemic” cases.72
The Court discounted any procedural safeguards, such as strict judicial
oversight and limited initial discovery, as impractical in a realistic judicial
world of loaded dockets and judges who are unfamiliar with details that
may or may not be uncovered in discovery. 73
Despite the majority’s concerns, the dissent pointed out that while the
majority quickly dispensed of Conley’s reasoning, at the time of the
decision, twenty-six states (including Oklahoma) used Conley’s language
when considering dismissal of a petition for failure to state a claim. 74
Further, the dissent maintained that the majority’s discovery concerns
called for “careful case management, including strict control of discovery,
careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage, and lucid

68. See id. at 553-55.
69. Id. at 553.
70. See id. at 554-55.
71. See id. at 558 (“[I]t is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust
complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust
discovery can be expensive.”) (internal citations omitted).
72. See id. at 559.
73. See id. at 559-60 (“We cannot prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot detect what
we cannot define; we cannot define ‘abusive’ discovery except in theory, because in practice
we lack essential information.” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U.
L. REV. 635, 638-39 (1989)).
74. See id. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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instructions to juries . . . [but did not] justify the dismissal of an adequately
pleaded complaint without even requiring defendant to file answers denying
a charge.” 75 Finally, the dissent argued that the purpose of relaxed pleading
was to keep plaintiffs in court,76 and if the Court wished to return to stricter
standards, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended, not reinterpreted. 77
The Twombly decision shook antitrust practice with the new plausibility
standard, but because the Court did not specify whether its newly
articulated pleading rules applied specifically to antitrust litigation or
broadly to all federal civil suits, circuit courts were left struggling to
determine whether to apply the seemingly stricter standards to their own
pleadings. 78
C. Erickson v. Pardus: An Attempted Clarification Ultimately Results in
Confusion
Less than three weeks after the Twombly decision was rendered, the
Supreme Court reviewed a Tenth Circuit decision affirming the District
Court for the District of Colorado’s dismissal of a section 1983 complaint. 79
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and
remanded the case.80 The complaint alleged that prison officials violated
the Eighth Amendment when they wrongfully terminated a prisoner’s
hepatitis C treatments which resulted in potential life-threatening
consequences for the plaintiff.81 The Supreme Court granted review
because the dismissal “depart[ed] in so stark a manner from the pleading
standard mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 82
The District Court dismissed the petition using Conley’s “no set of facts”
language, finding that the prisoner failed to allege facts showing substantial
harm that would not have ultimately resulted from his disease with or
without treatment.83 The District Court interpreted Conley as requiring the
plaintiff to allege the facts supporting each element of his claim in the
75. Id. at 573.
76. See id. at 575.
77. See id. at 595.
78. See discussion infra Part III.D.
79. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).
80. See id. at 94-95.
81. See id. at 89-90.
82. Id. at 90.
83. See Erickson v. Pardus, No. 05-CV-00405-LTB-MJW, 2006 WL 650131, at * 4 (D.
Colo. Mar. 13, 2006), aff’d, 198 Fed. App’x. 694 (10th Cir. 2006), vacated, 551 U.S. 89
(2007).
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petition which the plaintiff failed to do. 84 While it was possible to prove a
set of facts in the future that would support his accusations, the court held
that sufficient factual matter to support the allegations was absent from the
petition. 85 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal. 86
The Supreme Court reversed the decision.87 But, rather than citing the
“plausibility” standard for pleadings advanced in Twombly, the Court
reaffirmed another proposition from the Conley case; that in a petition, the
plaintiff must only “give notice” to the defendant of the grounds on which
his claim rests. 88 The Court also reiterated that the factual allegations in the
complaint must be accepted as true.89 This decision further troubled lower
courts and legal scholars who were grappling with Twombly’s application to
litigation beyond the antitrust realm. 90 If Twombly set a new requirement of
pleading factual “plausibility,” it seemed unusual, if not erroneous, that the
new standard was not used in a per curiam decision reviewing a similar
motion to dismiss.
D. Circuit Confusion After Twombly and Erickson Creates the Need for
Iqbal
In the wake of Twombly, circuit courts across the country each addressed
the Twombly decision while pleading for clarification from the Supreme
Court as they muddled through the confusing opinion. 91 Ultimately, each
84. See id. at *6.
85. See id. at *9.
86. See Erickson, 198 Fed. App’x at 701.
87. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94-95.
88. See id. at 93.
89. See id. at 94.
90. See Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 16 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (maintaining that Erickson “emphasized the continuation of the prior Rule 8(a)
standard”); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (refusing to
consider Erickson claiming it did not undermine Twombly’s pleading requirements);
Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio, 512 F.3d 338, 341 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008)
(claiming that Erickson was a clarification of Twombly); see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly,
Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 883 (2009) (“To
confuse matters even further . . . [the Court] upheld the sufficiency of a complaint in
Erickson v. Pardus without even mentioning the plausibility standard.”); Douglas G. Smith,
The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1085-86 (2009) (suggesting that although
some believe Erickson limited Twombly, this argument is “fanciful” and Erickson “reiterated
that the plausibility standard flowed directly from the text of Rule 8”); Josephson, supra note
2, at 902-03 (noting that “Erickson was written to reassure the lower courts that Rule 8 had
not been drastically revised”).
91. See Aktieselskabet, 525 F.3d at 15 (citing many courts who have “disagreed about the
import of Twombly”); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008) (considering
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adopted Twombly either as applicable only in certain contexts or as a
universal standard applying to all claims.
Initially, one set of circuits refused to give Twombly general application
and confined the plausibility requirements to antitrust or other complex
litigation. Within this set of circuits, cases in the Sixth Circuit, Seventh
Circuit, and Ninth Circuit applied the same factual requirements to all
complex litigation, such as all antitrust suits, or all litigation with
potentially expansive discovery. 92 In other cases, circuits held that the
amount of factual detail required depended specifically on the complexity
of the case. For example, a Seventh Circuit case noted “[a] complaint must
always . . . allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,’ and how many facts are enough will depend on the type of case.” 93
Similarly, the Second Circuit claimed, “we believe the Court is not
requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead
requiring a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to
amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such
amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”94
In Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 95 the Tenth Circuit first officially
adopted the Twombly “plausibility” pleading standard for all claims before
the court, but additionally noted that the decision in the case would be the
same under the new or old pleading standard.96 The Tenth Circuit later
the “mixed signals” of Twombly); Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.
2008) (“The issues raised by Twombly are not easily resolved, and likely will be a source of
controversy for years to come.”); Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508
F.3d 327, 337 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting “uncertainty concerning the scope” of Twombly);
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (evaluating “conflicting signals” identified
in Twombly).
92. See Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Courts in and out of
the Sixth Circuit have identified uncertainty regarding the scope of Twombly and have
indicated that its holding is likely limited to expensive, complicated litigation like that
considered in Twombly.”); Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963,
971 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that Twombly laid to rest the Conley standard but limited its
holding to antitrust cases); Midwest, 512 F.3d at 341 n.1 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007)) (“Twombly itself suggests that its holding may be limited to
cases likely to produce ‘sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming’ litigation.”); Tamayo
v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 2008) (indicating “[t]he task of applying
Bell Atlantic to the different types of cases that come before us continues” and applying the
standard to cases with costly discovery).
93. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
94. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (first emphasis added).
95. 493 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2007).
96. See id. at 1215 n.2.
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used language from Twombly to evaluate a motion to dismiss in Pace v.
Swerdlow, 97 but still seemed to give the rule liberal application, allowing
the claim to survive a motion to dismiss despite a vigorous dissent
countering that sufficient facts had not been pleaded under the Twombly
standard. 98
The Tenth Circuit admitted its confusion in Robbins v. Oklahoma, 99
when addressing an Eastern District of Oklahoma decision. The district
court denied a motion to dismiss in a suit against daycare workers and DHS
employees over the death of an eightBmonthBold child killed by blunt force
trauma. 100 The Conley “no set of facts” standard was used to grant the
motion to dismiss for the DHS employees. 101 Upon review, the Tenth
Circuit noted that the Twombly standard of pleading was “less than
pellucid,” citing other circuits that also struggled to ascertain the exact
meaning of the Supreme Court’s holding. 102 Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit
maintained that “the bedrock principle that a judge ruling on a motion to
dismiss must accept all allegations as true” remained, and moreover, “the
degree of specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice, and
therefore the need to include sufficient factual allegations, depend[ed] on
[the] context [of the case].” 103 Although the interpretation of what the
plausibility standard meant differed in all of the above circuits, each found
the Twombly holding to be limited to antitrust or complex litigation.
The remaining circuit courts applied Twombly universally, but disagreed
as to whether Twombly was a new standard, or a continuation of the
previous standard. 104 While the Third Circuit and Eighth Circuit applied a
97. 519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008).
98. See id. at 1073, 1076 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
99. 519 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008).
100. See id. at 1246.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1247.
103. Id. at 1247-48; see also Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008)
(citing the Twombly “plausibility” standard but noting that “[t]his is not to say that the
factual allegations must themselves be plausible; after all, they are assumed to be true. It is
just to say that relief must follow from the facts alleged”).
104. See Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that the
Conley standard “no longer governs in light of Twombly”); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d
298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that even after Erickson addressed a section 1983 claim,
the Twombly requirements were not undermined in the section 1983 claim before the court);
Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 n.4 (11th Cir. 2008)
(maintaining Twombly was a “further articulation of the standard by which to evaluate the
sufficiency of all claims brought pursuant to Rule 8(a)”); In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litig. 495 F.3d 191, 205 n.10 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that Twombly dispelled the Conley
standard).
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new plausibility standard to all motions to dismiss, 105 the District of
Columbia Circuit found that although Twombly applied to all cases, it
“le[ft] the long-standing fundamentals of notice pleading intact,” meaning
that the Supreme Court did not “intend[] to tighten pleading standards.”106
In essence, the Third Circuit and Eighth Circuit considered Twombly to be a
new standard that applied to claims before the court, but the District of
Columbia Circuit found that while Twombly applied universally, the former
standard had not been changed. Even after establishing that Twombly
applied to all litigation, the Third Circuit acknowledged that “to impose a
‘plausibility’ requirement outside the ' 1 context . . . leaves us with the
question of what it might mean.” 107 While the application differed, the
Third Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and District of Columbia Circuit applied their
interpretations of Twombly across the board to all claims and did not restrict
the decision to only antitrust cases or complex litigation.
Confusion among the circuit courts gave rise to a need for the Supreme
Court to revisit and clarify the application of the pleading requirements set
forth in Twombly.
E. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
In 2009, the Supreme Court finally addressed the uncertainty rendered by
Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 108 In Iqbal, the respondent, a Pakistani man,
was held on immigration charges and placed in a group of detainees labeled
“of high interest” while being investigated shortly after the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks. 109 Iqbal’s complaint focused on his treatment while
at the detention center Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit.110
Iqbal brought a Bivens action, which is a “private cause of action under the
Constitution . . . to recover damages against federal officers for violations
of [Constitutional] rights.” 111 Iqbal alleged that the petitioners, Robert
Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and John
105. See Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 2009) (interpreting
Twombly as “establishing a plausibility standard for [all] motions to dismiss”); Phillips v.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that the Twombly standard
was “intended to apply to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard in general”).
106. Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15-16 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
107. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234.
108. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
109. See id. at 1943.
110. See id. at 1943-44.
111. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *13
(E.D. N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 409 F.3d 143
(2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. (2009)
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Ashcroft, then Attorney General of the United States, “designated [him] a
person of high interest on account of his race,” and knew of and
implemented policies which resulted in harsh treatment and abuse of Iqbal
on account of his race. 112
The specific harsh treatment of which Iqbal complained included: (1)
solitary confinement, (2) constant light within his jail cell, (3) air
conditioning in his cell during winter, (4) heat in his cell during summer,
(5) hours of exposure to rain followed by a return to an air-conditioned jail
cell, (6) inadequate food resulting in a loss of 40 pounds, (7) name calling,
(8) two separate beatings, (9) denial of medical care, (10) denial of
communications with defense counsel, (11) denial of legal mail, (12) denial
of participation in prayers and other religious services, (13) daily strip
searches, and (14) at least four body cavity searches. 113 More specifically,
on one occasion, officers informed Iqbal he had a visitor, but instead took
him to a room filled with fifteen officers who “threw him against the wall,
kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him
across the room.” 114 On another occasion, officers performed three
consecutive strip and body-cavity searches of Iqbal all in the same room. 115
The same officers then turned off a recording camera and beat Iqbal while
escorting him back to his jail cell when he refused a fourth body cavity
search. 116 Before leaving Iqbal in his jail cell, one officer “urinated in the
toilet in Iqbal’s cell and turned the water off so the toilet could not be
flushed until the next morning.” 117
1. Circuit to Certiorari
When Iqbal’s case was heard before the district court, the Supreme Court
had not yet decided Twombly. 118 The district court noted that the parties’
disagreement over how specific the petition must be “expose[d] a tension
between the liberal pleading standards under the Federal Rules and one of
the core purposes of qualified immunity C protecting public officials from
the burdens of discovery against unmeritorious claims.” 119 But the court
ultimately determined that “the qualified immunity ‘standard [would] not
allow the Attorney General to carry out his national security functions
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942, 1944.
See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 149.
Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *4.
See id. at *5.
See id.
Id.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009).
Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *11.
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wholly free from concern for his personal liability; he may on occasion
have to pause [and] consider whether a proposed course of action can be
squared with the Constitution . . . .’”120 Much of Iqbal’s asserted treatment,
such as daily searches, was possibly consistent with either legitimate or
illegitimate activity. 121 However, the district court found that this judgment
was not appropriate for a motion to dismiss, because the court was to
“assume the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations and draw all inferences in
their favor.” 122 The district judge reasoned that “[p]laintiffs should not be
penalized for failing to assert more facts where, as here, the extent of
defendants’ involvement is peculiarly within their knowledge.’ 123
By the time the decision was reviewed by the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court had modified antitrust pleading requirements in Twombly.
The Second Circuit analyzed all conflicting signals in Twombly,
determining that while there were many indicators for the decision to be
applied narrowly to antitrust suits, there were also indicators that the
decision was meant to apply more broadly. 124 The Second Circuit chose to
apply Twombly only in situations “where such amplification [was] needed
to render the claim plausible,” 125 and refused to universally impose a
heightened pleading requirement as both Twombly and Erickson each
denied the creation of a heightened standard in Twombly. 126
In holding that the petition stated enough grounds to survive a motion to
dismiss, the Second Circuit recognized procedural tools useful in protecting
government officials during the suit, such as the use of a motion for more
definite statement, limited discovery with involved and approved judicial
oversight, and the use of a motion for summary judgment if discovery did
not produce evidence of personal liability. 127 The court held that while
Twombly could be interpreted as requiring additional facts to prove the
defendant’s express approval of Iqbal’s treatment, “all of the Plaintiff’s
allegations respecting the personal involvement of [defendants Hasty,
120. Id. at *14 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985)).
121. See id. at *16.
122. Id. at *16 (stating “the inquiry into what actions defendants took and the
reasonableness of those actions in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks is not one that
can be made on a motion to dismiss,” and finding “[i]n these circumstances, the objective
reasonableness of defendants’ actions is a question that, in my view, is properly addressed
only on a motion for summary judgment”).
123. Id. at *21.
124. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155-57 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
125. Id. at 157-58.
126. See id. at 158.
127. See id. at 158-59.

884

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:865

Ashcroft, and Mueller were] entirely plausible, without allegations of
additional subsidiary facts.” 128
In a concurring opinion, Judge Cabranes noted that case precedent,
including Twombly, was “less than crystal clear and fully deserve[d]
reconsideration by the Supreme Court at the earliest opportunity.” 129
Acting upon the confusion in the circuits courts as to Twombly’s
appropriate application, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
these concerns in Iqbal.
2. Twombly Confirmed as a Blanket Interpretation of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8
While to many circuit courts Iqbal was seen as an expansion of
Twombly, the Supreme Court expressly stated in Iqbal that the Twombly
decision was an interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which
provided the grounds for the sufficiency of an antitrust complaint, but that
by interpreting Rule 8, the decision “expounded the pleading standard for
‘all civil actions.’” 130
In evaluating Iqbal’s complaint, the majority first wholly rejected the
argument of supervisory liability under a Bivens claim and held that
“[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” 131 The
Court then broke the complaint into three sections of analysis: legal
conclusions, factual allegations, and plausible inferences.132 First, Iqbal
alleged that the plaintiffs were principal architects and instrumental in the
policy which singled him out for his “religion, race, and/or national origin”
and subjected him to “harsh conditions of confinement.”133 The majority
disregarded these statements as a “formulaic recitation of the elements” 134
and conclusory allegations, deeming the statements as “not entitled to be
assumed true.” 135 The Court maintained that it was “the conclusory nature
of respondent’s allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature,
that disentitle[d] them to the presumption of truth.”136
128. See id. at 166.
129. Id. at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring).
130. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
131. Id. at 1949.
132. See id. at 1951-52.
133. Id. at 1951 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Next, the Court considered the factual allegations of the complaint.
Specifically, the complaint first stated that the FBI “arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men” which was approved by defendant
Mueller. 137 Second, the complaint stated that the policy of keeping such
detainees in highly restrictive conditions was approved by both defendants
Mueller and Ashcroft. 138 The Court recognized these as factual allegations,
and acknowledged that “[t]aken as true, these allegations are consistent
with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees ‘of high interest’
because of their race, religion or national origin.” 139 Yet, although a
legitimate claim could be recognized, the Court then stated that “given
more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.” 140
The Court recognized that “[i]t should come as no surprise that a legitimate
policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of
their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental
impact on Arab Muslims . . . .” 141 Confusingly, the Court both claimed to
take the factual allegations as true, but then drew an inference in favor of
the defendant using Twombly’s plausibility standard.
Finally, the Court analyzed the claim in light of inferences that could be
drawn from the remaining factual allegations named, mainly that
“respondent’s arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination.” But
to prevail using this inference, the Court required Iqbal to show “facts
plausibly showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of
classifying . . . detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion,
or national origin.” Although only paragraphs before the Court recognized
that the factual contentions could be consistent with this notion, the Court
then chose to adopt what it considered the only plausible suggestion, that
“the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a
devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most
secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist
activity.” 142
The Court echoed its previous reasoning in Twombly, rejecting the
argument that any discovery controls would be adequate protection for
government officials exposed to discovery, as any discovery in the case
would be time-consuming, counteracting the very purpose of qualified
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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immunity C “to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including
‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’” 143
3. Dissent
Justice Souter, who had written for the majority in Twombly, took issue
with the Court’s subsequent application of the plausibility standard and
rejected the majority’s opinion on two grounds: (1) the majority
inappropriately rejected a claim of supervisory liability144 and (2) the
majority misapplied the pleading standard set forth in Twombly. 145 First,
the dissent pointed out that defendants Mueller and Ashcroft admitted they
could be found liable under a supervisory liability standard if actual
knowledge of the discriminatory practices was shown in conjunction with
indifference to that policy. 146 Further, “the parties agreed as to a proper
standard of supervisory liability, and the disputed question was whether
Iqbal’s complaint satisfied Rule 8(a)(2).” 147 The dissent highlighted that
the complete rejection of supervisory liability by the majority was
determined with no briefing, and addressed sua sponte by the Court, which
“denie[d] Iqbal a fair chance to be heard on the question.” 148
Because the dissent would recognize fault based on supervisory liability,
the dissent found the complaint sufficient because “[i]f these factual
allegations are true, [defendants] were, at the very least, aware of the
discriminatory policy being implemented and deliberately indifferent to
it.” 149 The dissent maintained that the majority misapplied Twombly,
stating that “Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss
stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true . . . . on
the contrary . . . a court must take the allegations as true, no matter how
skeptical the court may be.” 150 More emphatically, the dissent claimed
“[t]he sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently
fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the
plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.” 151 In sum, the
143. Id. at 1953 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
144. While the majority addressed the claim of supervisory liability, it is addressed in
this article only to the extent that recognition of supervisory liability would affect the motion
to dismiss before the Court. See id. at 1949, 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 1955.
146. See id. at 1956.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1957.
149. Id. at 1959.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id.
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dissent would not read allegations, factual or conclusory in isolation, but
rather would read the complaint as a whole, deeming the complaint
sufficient to give “‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’” 152 Ironically, the Court had taken Justice Souter’s own
words and applied them in a manner inconsistent with his intent in
Twombly.
While Justice Breyer joined Justice Souter’s dissent, he also wrote
separately to emphasize the many procedural devices available to trial
courts to protect government officials during the discovery process,
determining that the Court had not presented “convincing grounds for
finding these alternative case-management tools inadequate.” 153
F. State Pleading Standards Post Iqbal
Across the nation, state supreme courts, other than Oklahoma’s, have
varied in their interpretation and of Twombly and Iqbal. To date, no less
than eleven state supreme courts other than Oklahoma’s have addressed
pleading since the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. Of those eleven decisions,
two have expressly adopted the Twombly decision. 154 In Massachusetts,
when plaintiffs sued the Ford Motor Company over a defect in a door
handle, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted Twombly
analysis and stated that “[b]ecause the term ‘defect’ is conclusory and can
be subjective as well, a bare assertion that a defendant, while representing
the opposite, has knowingly manufactured and sold a product that is
‘defective,’ or suffers from ‘safety-related defects,’ does not suffice to state
a viable claim.” 155 Also adopting Twombly, the South Dakota Supreme
Court rejected a Jewish plaintiff’s petition based on a requirement of a
“showing” at the motion to dismiss level, rejecting the claim that his
constitutional rights were violated when he was served non-kosher food
while in prison. 156
Conversely, two state supreme courts have expressly rejected the
Twombly decision. 157 The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the
dismissal of a bad faith suit and explicitly held that in Arizona, courts were
152. See id. at 1961 (omission in original) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
153. Id. at 1962 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. See Sisney v. Best Inc., 2008 SD 70, && 7-8, 754 N.W.2d 804, 808-09; Iannacchino
v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008).
155. Iannacchino, 888 N.E.2d at 888.
156. See Sisney, && 1, 8, 754 N.W.2d at 806, 808-09.
157. See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 347 (Ariz. 2008); Colby v.
Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, & 5 n.1, 184 Vt. 1, 955 A.2d 1082.
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to assume the truth of plaintiff’s facts and draw inferences from the facts
alleged. 158 The Arizona court held that “Arizona has not revised the
language or interpretation of Rule 8 in light of Twombly.” 159 Moreover,
while legal conclusions “d[id] not invalidate a complaint . . . a complaint
that state[d] only legal conclusions, without any supporting factual
allegations, d[id] not satisfy . . . [the] notice pleading standard.”160 The
Supreme Court of Vermont also rejected the Twombly plausibility standard
in a wrongful termination suit referring to a complaint as “a bare bones
statement that merely provides the defendant with notice of the claims
against it.” 161 The court stated, “we have relied on the Conley standard for
over twenty years, and are in no way bound by federal jurisprudence in
interpreting our state pleading rules . . . . [we] are unpersuaded by the
dissent’s argument that we should now abandon it for a heightened
standard.” 162 These two state supreme courts kept the bar low for plaintiffs,
allowing legal conclusions and factual allegations, so long as the defendant
was put on notice of the claim against him.
Four other state supreme courts have cited Twombly’s reasoning in
interpreting their own statute, but have not wholly adopted the decision. 163
The Delaware Supreme Court retained its “any set of facts” language
without discussing the Twombly opinion, but acknowledged it through
citation in a footnote. 164 In Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court evaluated a
civil perjury claim and used an “any set of facts” standard to evaluate the
complaint. 165 In its analysis, the court recognized the Twombly decision
and found it applicable to the case at hand because like the suit in Twombly,
“civil perjury claims may lead to abuse if more specificity in pleading is not
required.” 166 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed a motion
to dismiss by looking only to the facts, accepted as true, drawing reasonable
inferences for the plaintiff, and indicating that Twombly supported the
proposition that a court is not bound by legal conclusions in its

158. See Cullen, 189 P.3d at 346.
159. Id. at 347.
160. Id. at 346.
161. Colby, 2008 VT 20, & 13.
162. Id. & 5 n.1.
163. See Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 182 (Del. 2009); Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME
18, & 11, 939 A.2d 676, 680; Herbert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn.
2008).
164. See Reid, 970 A.2d at 182 n.23.
165. See Bean, & 7, 939 A.2d at 679.
166. Id. & 11, 939 A.2d at 680.
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determination. 167 In Georgia, a dissenting opinion cited Twombly for the
proposition that a plaintiff must include “more than a formulaic recitation
of the elements . . . ,” although the case was not used in the majority
opinion’s analysis. 168
Two state supreme courts have addressed pleading requirements, but
have used some form of the “no set of facts” language from Conley to
support their analysis, either expressly refusing to address the Twombly and
Iqbal decisions, or not addressing the decisions because they were not
raised in arguments. 169 The Supreme Court of Indiana recently noted that
“dismissal is improper unless it appears to a certainty on the face of the
complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to any relief,” but
maintained that the plaintiff was still required to “plead the operative facts
necessary to set forth an actionable claim.” 170 The court recognized the
recent Twombly decision, but did not expressly address the decision
because the parties in the case did not make it an issue. 171 Most recently,
the Supreme Court of Montana used its standard “no set of facts” language
to construe a complaint, maintaining that Montana precedent “reflect[ed]
the principle that liberal rules of pleading allow for compliance with the
spirit and intent of the law rather than a rigid adherence [for] formula or
specific words.” 172 In the Montana case, a plaintiff whose legs were
tragically amputated after a workplace accident claimed the dismissal
prevented him from “develop[ing] the record through discovery sufficiently
to establish the facts necessary to prove his claims.” 173 In response, the
court recognized that “further discovery may constitute an appropriate
remedy for lack of specificity in a complaint.” 174
Finally, and somewhat uniquely, the Supreme Court of Tennessee did
not address Twombly or Iqbal in a recent decision, but relied on its previous
standard of review for motions to dismiss, which does not mirror the
Conley “no set of facts” language. 175 The court looked to the facts alleged
167. See Herbert, 744 N.W.2d at 229, 235.
168. See Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found. Inc. v. State Election Bd., 654 S.E.2d 127, 132
(Ga. 2007) (Sears, J., dissenting) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955
(2007)).
169. See State v. Am. Family Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293, 296 n.1 (Ind. 2009);
McKinnon v. W. Sugar Coop. Corp., 2010 MT 24, && 12, 17, 355 Mont. 120, 225 P.3d
1221.
170. Am. Family Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d at 296.
171. See id. at 296 n.1.
172. McKinnon, & 17.
173. See id. && 5, 17.
174. Id.
175. See Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tenn. 2009).

890

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:865

on the face of the complaint, but acknowledged that even if the facts were
true they would not necessarily show a cause of action.176 The court
maintained that a motion to dismiss would not be sustained unless “there
are no facts warranting relief.” 177 The court did not reference Conley, or
reference a set of material to be proved in the future, but additionally did
not refer to a plausibility standard or other language from Twombly or
Iqbal. 178
Currently, Oklahoma’s statutory pleading requirement for stating a claim
for relief is nearly identical in language to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2), with both requiring the plaintiff to provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”179
However, even after the Twombly decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has continued to cite Conley and evaluate claims with liberal treatment of
factual statements, legal conclusions, and inferences drawn from the
claim. 180 The court routinely cites its standard of review for motions to
dismiss stating:
[m]otions to dismiss are generally viewed with disfavor. The
purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the law that governs the
claim in litigation, not the underlying facts. A motion to dismiss
. . . will not be sustained unless it should appear without doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
for relief. When considering a defendant’s quest for dismissal,
the court must take as true all of the challenged pleading’s
allegations together with all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from them. . . . If relief is possible under any set of facts
which can be established and is consistent with the allegations, a
motion to dismiss should be denied. A petition can generally be
dismissed only for lack of any cognizable legal theory to support
the claim or for insufficient facts under a cognizable legal
theory. 181
In addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that “[i]f [defendant]
desires to elicit additional facts or wishes to challenge the claim for lack of
sufficient facts to support it, it should resort to discovery or seek summary
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), with 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2008(a)(1) (2001).
180. See Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 2008 OK 1, & 7 n.13, 176 P.3d 1204, 1208 n.13.
181. Id. & 7, 176 P.3d at 1208-09 (second emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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judgment.” 182 Most recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court used these
same standards to evaluate a claim under a motion to dismiss even after the
Supreme Court clarified its opinion on the matter in Iqbal. 183
Oklahoma will almost certainly adopt the Twombly decision for antitrust
litigation, as the state has chosen to apply federal antitrust case precedent
for purposes of the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act. 184 Apart from this
legislation, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma will have discretion as to
whether it is best to maintain the pleading practice in force for decades or
adopt a new plausibility standard to be in uniformity with federal precedent
in all civil cases. Thus far, the Oklahoma Supreme Court does not appear
persuaded by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Iqbal to alter its general
civil pleading standards.
IV. Analysis: To Plead But Not to Prove: Proposed Reform for Oklahoma
While Oklahoma should not wholly adopt the reasoning of Twombly and
Iqbal, it should protect defendants from meritless claims through a more
stringent application of current standards. The most controversial phrase on
which Oklahoma courts rely is derived from Conley’s “no set of facts”
language. Oklahoma courts frequently state that “[a] motion to dismiss . . .
will not be sustained unless it should appear without doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of the claim for relief.”185 In order to
determine the composition of the Oklahoma standard, and how it should be
more accurately applied, this phrase should be closely examined. First, a
“claim” is more than a legal theory, and Oklahoma’s statute should require
at least minimal factual allegations, with or without an accompanying legal
theory, in order to show plaintiff’s right to relief. Second, when
considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s factual
assertions should be taken as true, giving the Plaintiff the benefit of the
doubt, and not unfairly holding him to a plausibility standard.
A. Stating a Claim Still Requires Enough Facts to Put the Defendant on
Notice
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
incorporation of these rules into Oklahoma Pleading Code, Oklahoma
adopted “notice pleading.” 186 Twombly accurately stated that in notice
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. & 7 n.17, 176 P.3d at 1209 n.17 (emphasis omitted).
See Kirby v. Jean’s Plumbing Heat & Air, 2009 OK 65, & 5, 222 P.3d 21, 24.
See 79 OKLA. STAT. ' 212.
See Darrow, & 7, 176 P.3d at 1208.
See 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. ' 2008 committee cmt. (2010) (citing Conley v. Gibson,

892

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:865

pleading “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to
see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair
notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim
rests.” 187 So, while the petition cannot merely engage in a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” 188 the plaintiff is not barred
from including the elements of a cause of action C he must merely support
those elements with enough factual allegations to put the defendant on
notice. Importantly, Oklahoma’s Committee Comment to the newlyadopted notice pleading statute stated that by “omitting any reference to
facts” the new standard mirrored the federal standard and helped avoid the
confusion previously experienced under code pleading. 189 The Committee
Comment did not eliminate factual pleading, but rather eliminated
references to factual pleading, so that pleaders are not bogged down in
differentiating ultimate facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions of law.190
Twombly also properly identified a problem with Conley’s current
application in many courts. The Court noted that Conley’s “no set of facts”
language “[could] be read in isolation as saying that any statement
revealing the theory of the claim w[ould] suffice unless its factual
impossibility may be shown from the face of the pleadings.” 191 In other
words, under this misinterpretation, the plaintiff may state his claim by
stating his legal theory (i.e., elements of his cause of action), relying on
Conley to add all factual details later in the litigation. Using this reading of
Conley, the Twombly court feared an abundant abuse of discovery tools and
court resources, and relied on these dangers as the primary reasons for
requiring more strict factual pleading. 192 Twombly cited a Memorandum
which reported that “discovery account[ed] for as much as 90 percent of
litigation costs.” 193 Similarly, the expense of discovery in antitrust cases
and qualified immunity cases is also present for defendants in many other
civil suits in federal court and in Oklahoma.

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (stating that the new function of the pleadings is to “giv[e] ‘fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’”).
187. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).
188. Id. at 555.
189. 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. ' 2008 committee cmt.
190. See generally id.
191. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
192. See id. at 558-60.
193. Id. at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (May 11, 1999), (192 F.R.D. 340, 357 (2000) [hereinafter Memorandum]).
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A court’s resources are wasted when valuable time is stolen with endless
motions, requiring defendants to produce documents they do not feel the
plaintiff is entitled to without sufficient basic factual matter to apprise the
defendant of who is suing him for what in the first place. For these reasons,
the Twombly Court emphasized that a meritless claim should be identified
at the first available opportunity to save time and resources.194 However,
the Twombly Court did not utilize another important figure from the same
Memorandum, that “in almost 40% of federal cases, discovery is not used at
all, and in an additional substantial percentage of cases, only about three
hours of discovery occurs.” 195 While Twombly and Iqbal reasoning is
easily applied to cases where a defendant is in danger of shelling out 90%
of his funds toward discovery, for many defendants, the cost of discovery is
minor or non-existent, unless these defendants are settling for the purpose
of avoiding expansive discovery.
On top of potential subjection to intrusive discovery, when a defendant is
only presented with a recitation of the elements of a statute, the defendant
does not have adequate information to respond to allegations, and he must
include a plethora of possibly meaningless defenses, lest they be waived. 196
To aid the pleader in determining how many facts to allege, Oklahoma and
federal forms give assistance by demonstrating a typical negligence
claim. 197 In Oklahoma, the form petition alleges: (1) a date and place of the
incident, (2) an allegation that defendant was driving negligently, (3) a
detailed account of plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) a demand of judgment. 198
If Conley was applied in Oklahoma in an incorrect manner, then unlike
the above petition, in a suit for negligence, the plaintiff’s mere legal
conclusion that the defendant was negligent would suffice to survive a
motion to dismiss creating much difficulty for the defendant. For example,
suppose a driver has been involved in more than one auto accident, each
time rear-ending the car in front of him. The driver has been served in a
claim which states that he negligently drove his vehicle, causing neck injury
to the plaintiff. Based on the face of the petition, the defendant may not
have any idea which of the many drivers is suing him without engaging in
his own “fact-finding,” having been supplied with only the plaintiff’s name
194. Id. at 558.
195. See Memorandum, supra note 193, at 357.
196. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B)(ii) (stating that a defense is waived if not included in
the responsive pleading); see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2012(B) (2001) (requiring that “[e]very
defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading . . . shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required”).
197. See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 11; see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2027 Form 8.
198. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2027 Form 8.
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and a blanket allegation of the defendant’s negligence. Under a
misinterpretation of Conley’s “no set of facts,” the plaintiff’s claim survives
a motion to dismiss and he is permitted to flesh out all details to support his
legal conclusion later in the suit, instead of at a minimum apprising the
defendant of the date and place of the accident as suggested by Oklahoma
and federal forms. And while “statute of limitations” may be a defense for
a wreck which occurred five years ago, it would not be appropriate for an
accident which occurred only months before. Nevertheless, the defendant
would be forced to respond with every defense, whether applicable or not,
because of this lack of information.
The result could resemble “boilerplate pleading,” where the plaintiff
merely recites a statute, planning on engaging in later discovery to drum up
a factual claim, and where the defendant is forced to plead every defense in
existence because he does not know why he is being sued. The product of
this “boilerplate pleading” would ultimately be a waste of judicial time and
resources, yielding a petition and responsive pleading that were mere
formalities, not serving any informative purpose whatsoever. Under a
proper interpretation of Conley, plaintiff should be required, in accordance
with Oklahoma forms, to plead at the minimum the date and the place of
the incident. This information properly puts the defendant on notice of the
accident for which he is being sued, without additional fact-finding by the
defendant before his answer is due.
Requiring the plaintiff to include factual allegations in his petition is still
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley. In Conley, the
respondents were sued under the Railway Labor Act under which the Court
required exclusive bargaining agents to “represent all employees in the
bargaining unit fairly and without discrimination because of race.” 199 In the
plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiffs did not merely allege that they were
employees in the bargaining unit who were discriminated against because
of their race. 200 This allegation would have been a formulaic recitation of
the elements. Rather, the complaint alleged the railroads at which plaintiffs
were employed; identified the bargaining agents responsible; alleged that a
contract existed protecting the plaintiffs from discharge; included facts of
the plaintiff’s discharge including dates of the discharge and numbers of
black employees discharged and white employees hired; and finally
contained further allegations that grievances from the discharged black

199. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42 (1957), abrogated in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
200. See id. at 42-43.
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employees were made to, and ignored by, the bargaining agents. 201 This
gave the Court adequate ground for holding that the plaintiffs had stated a
claim for relief, and therefore the “no set of facts” language used by the
Court referred to future factual matter needed to prove the many factual
allegations already laid out in the complaint.202
In Oklahoma, the purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim is to determine, under the facts plaintiff has alleged, if there is a legal
theory on which the plaintiff may prevail if any set of facts later proves
plaintiff’s factual allegations in the petition.203 Like Conley, the reference
to fact-finding in the future does not eliminate the need for factual detail in
the petition, as factual allegations should be an indispensable part of the
“claim.” Rather, they are two separate standards. The plaintiff must first
use enough factual detail to put the defendant on notice. In Oklahoma, this
means using factual allegations, possibly together with legal conclusions
from which a right to relief may be inferred. The plaintiff must later meet a
higher standard in his case by showing evidence (a set of facts) to prove the
factual allegations contained in the petition in order to prevail on his claim.
This heightened level of proof may come to play at a motion for summary
judgment, or at trial, but it should not be required at the pleading stage.
The requirement of some level of factual detail in the petition is
supported by the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s standard that “[a] petition can
generally be dismissed only for lack of any cognizable legal theory to
support the claim or for insufficient facts under a cognizable legal
theory.” 204 This standard is two-fold. A claim may be dismissed (1) with
abundant factual detail, but for which no legal theory exists to support a
claim; or (2) with too little factual detail, even if a legal theory in support of
those facts exists. 205 In either case the language seems to acknowledge that
at least some factual detail is mandatory under Oklahoma’s current
standard; otherwise, the court would not dismiss a petition for “too little
factual detail.” The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals explains that
“[p]articular pleading requirements include ‘only the degree of specificity
necessary to enable the opposing party to prepare his responsive pleadings
and defenses.’ Such specifications include time and place, but not evidence
or ‘detailed evidentiary matters.’” 206
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See id.
See id. at 45-46.
See Kirby v. Jean’s Plumbing Heat & Air, 2009 OK 65, & 5, 222 P.3d 21, 24.
Id. (second emphasis added).
See id.
McFeely v. Tredway, 1990 OK CIV APP 71, & 13, 816 P.2d 575, 578 (citations
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In the model petition, the date and place of the incident (facts), combined
with negligence (legal theory of relief), are sufficient to put the defendant
on notice for why he is being sued. In practice, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has held that when a plaintiff “asserted the existence of a contract, the
breach thereof, and facts from which it might be determined that the breach
was in bad faith” she had sufficiently met requirements of notice
pleading. 207 The plaintiff had sufficient factual allegations and a supporting
legal theory for relief (bad faith).208
If a plaintiff merely alleged “defendant was driving negligently and
caused plaintiff injury” or “defendant breached a contract in bad faith” then
the plaintiff would have only pleaded legal conclusions (recitation of the
elements), without any factual allegations, and the petition would not be
sufficient to give the defendant notice as to why he is being sued.
Additionally, if the plaintiff had not pleaded his legal theory supporting
relief, he would need to show additional facts from which a legal theory for
relief could be identified, such as the fact that the defendant ran a red light,
allowing the court to draw a reasonable inference of negligence.
By examining what a “claim” consists of and determining that one
important element of a claim in Oklahoma is factual support sufficient to
put the defendant on notice, the use of Conley’s “no set of facts” language
can be adequately reconciled with the Twombly holding that deems a
“formulaic recitation of the elements” as insufficient for notice pleading.
Because the Conley standard would still require some level of factual detail
in order to put the defendant on notice, it should continue to be used in
Oklahoma when evaluating a motion to dismiss.
B. Give a Plaintiff the Benefit of the Doubt, and Do Not Apply a
“Plausibility” Standard
Both federal courts and Oklahoma courts require a court reviewing a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim to take all of a plaintiff’s
factual allegations as true for the purpose of hearing that motion.209 A court
is required to accept all allegations in the plaintiff’s petition as true, not
merely those that are “probably true.”210 As the dissent in Iqbal points out,
omitted).
207. See Gens v. Casady Sch., 2008 OK 5, & 12, 177 P.3d 565, 570.
208. See id.
209. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)”
(internal citations omitted)); Kirby, & 5, 222 P.3d at 24.
210. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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this should mean that unless a plaintiff is making allegations “sufficiently
fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the
plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel” then the court
does not have discretion of whether or not to believe the plaintiff. 211
Additionally, in Oklahoma, the court must draw all inferences in favor of
the plaintiff as true. 212 This is a logical standard, because a plaintiff is not
required to prove his case at a motion to dismiss, and an ultimate fact may
be inferred from a set of “evidentiary facts.” A plaintiff is given the benefit
of the doubt, and if any set of facts could later be shown which would
entitle him to his claim for relief, then his petition should survive a motion
to dismiss. Thus, in a petition in which the alleged conduct could be lawful
or unlawful, the inference of illegal conduct should be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff, as the plaintiff could prove a set of facts later in support of illegal
conduct.
However, this standard is directly at odds with Twombly’s imposition
that the plaintiff’s claim be plausible. Under Twombly, if allegations in the
complaint are consistent with evidence of both legal and illegal behavior,
then the plaintiff’s claim will not survive a motion to dismiss. 213 Twombly
specifically requires that a complaint “allow[] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”
creating a requirement that “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” 214 But even Twombly confounds this
standard by then clarifying that “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is
improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’”215 Iqbal
then suggests that a court refuse to consider any legal conclusions, and then,
evaluating what remains in the petition, determine whether the claim is
plausible. 216

211. Id.
212. See Kirby, & 5, 222 P.3d at 24.
213. A claim consistent with legal and illegal behavior was at issue in both Twombly and
Iqbal. In Twombly, an allegation of parallel behavior could have been proved illegal, but
could also have been the product of legal happenstance. See Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007). In Iqbal, while the plaintiff made specific allegations of heinous
treatment based on his race, the Court identified that the treatment could have also been (and
was more likely) a product of a legitimate government policy enacted after the September
11, 2001 attacks. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
214. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554, 556).
215. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
216. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
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But notice pleading, as evidenced by federal and Oklahoma forms which
were created specifically to guide practitioners in pleading their petitions,
does not require rejection of legal conclusions. 217 After pleading the
statement of jurisdiction (in federal court only), the plaintiff is only advised
to plead one sentence about the defendant’s specific conduct: that “[o]n
date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the
plaintiff.” 218 This means the petition’s reference to the defendant’s conduct
would contain one factual statement: that on a certain date and time the
defendant was driving. 219 The second statement shows the plaintiff’s right
to relief, or a legal conclusion: that the defendant was driving
negligently. 220 Under Conley, the plaintiff has sufficiently put the
defendant on notice, but must later prove his allegations through a set of
facts to show: that the defendant was driving at that time and place, that he
was driving negligently, and the plaintiff sustained injury.
Yet under Twombly and Iqbal a court could consider the legal conclusion
(negligent driving) as not entitled to an inference of misconduct because it
is a general allegation, unsupported by any meaningful facts.221 The
plaintiff has not alleged that by “running a red light the defendant was
driving negligently” or that “by crossing the median defendant was driving
negligently.” Rather, the plaintiff has made a limited set of factual
statements together with a legal conclusion that could be proved later by a
set of facts to be uncovered in discovery, such as the production of the
police report or the depositions of witnesses to the accident. Because the
Iqbal court would not entertain the truth of a general allegation of
negligence, the plaintiff would have failed to state a claim while using the
federal forms. The plaintiff’s remaining factual allegation, then put to a
“plausibility” test, would not show that the defendant acted unlawfully.
The federal form is clearly more aligned with a proper interpretation of
Conley than the plausibility standard and rejection of legal conclusions in
Iqbal. If Oklahoma adopts Twombly’s approach to legal conclusions, it
should first examine the Oklahoma forms, as the same situation would also
likely occur in Oklahoma courts.
217. See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 11; 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2027 Form 8 (2001).
218. See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 11.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), to support the proposition that courts are not under an obligation
to accept a legal conclusion as true); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (stating
“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
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Using similar analysis, the Supreme Court of Vermont recently held that
when using the Vermont forms 222 “the term ‘negligently’ [was] a legal
conclusion” under notice pleading, and “the complaint include[d] no further
factual allegations regarding the specific actions by the defendant that the
plaintiff allege[d] amounted to negligence.” 223 The Supreme Court of
Vermont affirmed this standard, refusing to adopt Twombly noting that the
current standard “strike[s] a fair balance, at the early stages of litigation,
between encouraging valid, but as yet underdeveloped, causes of action and
discouraging baseless or legally insufficient ones.” 224 The purpose of a
petition in Vermont, as in Oklahoma, is to “initiate the cause of action, not
prove the merits of the plaintiff’s case.” 225 If the plaintiff’s factual
allegations are not impossible, he should be entitled to proceed past a
motion to dismiss.
The application of a plausibility standard and the rejection of legal
conclusions is in direct contrast to a policy of taking the plaintiff’s factual
allegations as true. Because the federal and Oklahoma forms only require a
minimum amount of factual detail in a complaint, a set of facts alone will
rarely show a plausible claim without an accompanying legal conclusion. If
the plausibility standard was aligned with the notion of giving the plaintiff
the benefit of the doubt, then Iqbal’s complaint that he was identified,
arrested, and detained because of his race/national origin would have been a
sufficient, believable inference drawn from his factual allegations of
treatment, rather than an inference that was deemed not as likely as other
possibilities.
Maintaining Oklahoma’s standard of “tak[ing] as true all of the
challenged pleading’s allegations together with all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from them” 226 continues to be the most consistent
standard with federal and state forms on how to plead. If the limited
amount of factual detail in the petition, such as time and place of the
incident, is sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the reason he is
being sued, and this is supported by a legal theory which could possibly
222. See Vt. Rules of Civ. Pro. app. Form 9 (2000). This Vermont form is nearly
identical to the corresponding Oklahoma and federal form. See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form
11; 12 OKLA. STAT. ' 2027 Form 8 (2001); Vt. Rules of Civ. Pro. app. Form 9. The form
consists of: (1) On date and place defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against
plaintiff; (2) a statement of plaintiff’s resulting injuries; and (3) and demand of judgment.
See Vt. Rules of Civ. Pro. app. Form 9.
223. Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, & 12, 184 Vt. 1, 955 A.2d 1082.
224. Id. & 13.
225. Id. (emphasis added).
226. Kirby v. Jean’s Plumbing Heat & Air, 2009 OK 65, & 5, 222 P.3d 21, 24.
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entitle the plaintiff to relief, then the claim should survive a motion to
dismiss. Keeping this standard will ensure that while a plaintiff must plead
factual allegations, he need not offer any level of proof of plausibility for
these allegations at a motion to dismiss and will be provided an opportunity
to engage in discovery to bolster his claim. Granting the motion to dismiss
on a plausibility basis means that a plaintiff has received a judgment on his
case before the defendant is even required to deny the allegations in an
answer. 227
In light of a proper interpretation of Conley, what should happen to the
plaintiff, wrongfully convicted of rape, who has been thrown out of the
Tenth Circuit for making general allegations? It seems that under either a
strict or a liberal pleading standard the Tenth Circuit properly dismissed the
wrongfully convicted plaintiff’s claims against the police chief in Bryson v.
Gonzales. 228 The court searched the claim for any factual allegations that
would indicate the police chief’s involvement. 229 First, the plaintiff’s
petition recognized that the police chief was not in office during the alleged
time evidence was withheld from the plaintiff; and after the police chief
was in office, there is no allegation that he was asked for evidence and
unconstitutionally refused it to the plaintiff.230 Second, the plaintiff did not
allege any personal participation the police chief had with a police chemist,
a second defendant in the case.231 Finally, as to the remaining defendant,
the district attorney, the court acknowledged that the police chief had no
supervisory control or power over the district attorney, and so any wrongful
actions could not attributed to the police chief.232 While the court noted
that the plaintiff “may have many valid claims against many people,”
without any wrongful facts attributable to the police chief a claim against
him could not stand. 233
In sum, in order to “state his claim” a plaintiff must at a minimum
include some facts that apprise a defendant of the nature of the suit against
him. This must be more than recitation of a legal theory. If a plaintiff does
not include a legal theory in his complaint, more than the minimal facts
suggested by pleading forms may be needed in order for the court to
227. Typically, a plaintiff is granted leave to amend his petition. If granted leave to
amend, then this judgment would not be “final;” however, the plaintiff would still be
punished despite following federal or state forms when pleading his case.
228. See 534 F.3d 1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2008).
229. Id. at 1288-90.
230. Id. at 1288.
231. Id. at 1289.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1290.
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determine if a legal theory exists entitling the plaintiff to relief.234 Once the
plaintiff has met this standard, he has succeeded in giving the defendant
notice, even if his claim could just as possibly be evidence of legal conduct,
so long as the plaintiff could also show evidence of illegal conduct. A
plaintiff’s claim should not be judged by the court to determine plausibility
of his claim.
It is important to remember that the defendant may quickly raise a
motion for summary judgment if he believes that there is no genuine issue
of material fact before the court, meaning that even after discovery (or
limited discovery) the plaintiff does not have any set of facts available to
him to prove his claim. While the defendant in a negligence claim may
have been driving in a reasonable manner, on a motion to dismiss the court
should still “assume the truth of plaintiffs’ allegation[] and draw all
inferences in [his] favor” 235 and save “the inquiry into what actions
defendants took and the reasonableness of those actions” 236 for a motion for
summary judgment. A possible claim is a claim worthy of discovery.
Whether the allegations are believable, plausible, or probable are all
determinations to be made by the court at a later date.
V. Conclusion
In order to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action” 237 before a court, each court must balance both a plaintiff’s
and a defendant’s right to relief, for what is “just” remains in the eye of the
beholder. Defendants would prefer the dismissal of every petition before
the court (an arguably inexpensive and speedy determination), and plaintiffs
would prefer the most bare
allegations to suffice. A middle ground
exists which requires a plaintiff to put forward enough facts to put a
defendant on notice of why he is being sued. If there are insufficient facts
for a court to infer a cause of action, the plaintiff must also claim the basis
for his right to relief. But this claim should not then be put to an additional
“plausibility” test. This middle ground creates an avenue to eliminate
meritless claims early in the litigation process while still allowing plaintiffs
234. For example, in the pleading form for injury from negligent driving, if the plaintiff
had not identified the negligence of the defendant as his basis for relief, he would have
needed additional facts allowing the court to infer negligence on the part of the other driver.
235. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 235202 at *16
(E.D. N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143
(2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
236. Id. at *19.
237. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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an opportunity to prove a claim that, based on the pleading, is legally and
factually possible. Oklahoma’s current standard, employing the “no set of
facts” language, may fulfill such a role if properly applied. While the
process is arguably less speedy than application of the Iqbal plausibility
standard, and both the plaintiff and the defendant may incur some expense,
refraining from a determination of plausibility when considering a motion
to dismiss will, in the long run, be most just.
Paula M. Williams

